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The balance sheet of the European Central Bank (ECB) represents a very small fraction (one-
tenth) of the reported balance sheet of the Euro Area system as a whole.  This paper presents 
evidence that the effective size of the ECB’s balance sheet is massively higher than this, and 
indeed is significantly higher even than the reported balance sheet of the Eurosystem as a 
whole. We point to strong evidence that most NCBs (especially those of the larger countries) 
effectively act on autopilot, as branches of a near-monolithic institution which we term the 
“Mega-ECB”. The lending behaviour of the “Mega-ECB” appears to have been driven 
primarily by the borrowing needs of the distressed countries of the EU’s southern periphery. 
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How big is the ECB? According to the official data, the European Central Bank (ECB)  
represents only a very small  fraction (one-tenth) of the reported balance sheet of the Euro 
Area system of National Central Banks (NCBs), known as the Eurosystem. This paper argues 
that the effective size of the ECB’s balance sheet is significantly higher, and has grown even 
faster, than the reported balance sheet of the Eurosystem as a whole. We point to strong 
evidence that most NCBs (especially those of the larger countries) effectively act on autopilot, 
as branches of what we term the “Mega-ECB”. 
We are not the first to argue that the reported balance sheet of the Eurosystem understates its 
true size, because it nets off intra-Eurosystem balances (see for example Whelan, 2012 and 
Tornell, 2012). But the magnitude of this understatement has not as yet been quantified. We 
first do the quantification, and then examine the relationship between the true balance sheet 
and those of the NCBs. It is the nature of this relationship that leads us to refer to the concept 
of the “Mega-ECB”. 
We3 collate data from each of the NCBs’ published balance sheets over the period 2006-2016, 
each of which includes data on intra-Eurosystem claims, and then aggregate to produce a new 
gross balance sheet of total Eurosystem assets (ESTA) that, in contrast to the official balance 
sheet data published by the ECB, does not net these claims. This total has a number of key 
features: 
 It is (unsurprisingly) distinctly larger, and has grown more rapidly than the official 
published figure. 
 This alternative measure reveals a strong systematic relationship with the balance 
sheets of NCBs, which suggests that these more or less run on autopilot: expanding 
their balance sheets closely in line with shares in the (ostensibly tiny) paid-up equity 
in the ECB. This relationship is much less evident in official published figures for the 
Eurosystem. 
 This relationship leads us to view this alternative measure as the balance sheet of the 
“Mega-ECB” – a near-monolithic entity, whose balance sheet dwarfs that of the actual 
ECB. 
 Over the period for which we have data, the lending behaviour of the “Mega-ECB” 
appears to have been driven primarily by the borrowing needs of the distressed 
countries of the EU’s southern periphery. 
The first part of the paper presents a new historical dataset of the balance sheets of all the 
nineteen individual NCBs and the ECB spanning over the 2006 to 2016 period drawing on 
annual central bank reports. Drawing on this dataset, a balance sheet of the Eurosystem is 
                                                          
3 One of the authors, Stephen Wright, wishes to acknowledge that all the hard work on this front, and indeed on 
the paper as a whole, was carried out by his co-author Charmaine Portelli. 
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compiled through a simple amalgamation of all the nineteen individual NCBs and the ECB – 
a detailed set of disaggregated accounts of the Eurosystem. This balance sheet is compared 
with the Eurosystem balance sheet as published by the ECB – a set of consolidated accounts 
of the Eurosystem. Our data show that the balance sheet of the Eurosystem as compiled in 
this way was significantly larger than that published by the ECB over the crisis period. This 
is because the ECB eliminates particular items on the balance sheet of the NCBs, mainly 
related to intra-Eurosystem transactions, as part of the consolidation process and therefore 
these do not feature in the Eurosystem balance sheet.  
Based on the data presented here, the paper then compares the distribution of total assets 
amongst the NCBs and the distribution of the paid-up ECB capital. It shows that, for most  
NCBs, their shares in the (tiny) capital of the ECB, to a very good approximation, drive their 
shares of total assets. In other words, the NCBs appear to expand their balance sheet on auto-
pilot, in line with their share of the capital of the ECB. This predictive power is striking 
particularly as the paid-up capital of the ECB accounts for a mere 0.1 per cent of total assets. 
On this tiny fulcrum, the ECB achieves effective control of a massively larger balance sheet: 
thus we refer to this as the balance sheet of the “Mega-ECB”.  Strikingly, this relationship is 
distinctly stronger for the large NCBs while smaller NCBs illustrate at least some degree of 
autonomy.  
We then show that if we examine the relationship between NCB balance sheets and the 
published balance sheet of the Eurosystem, the relationship is distinctly weaker. Nor indeed 
should this weaker relationship be surprising, since, as we also document, the behaviour of 
intra-Eurosystem balances varies very significantly between countries.  
Finally, we examine some of the details of intra-Eurosystem transactions, as revealed by NCB 
balance sheets. In particular, we focus on the emerging pattern of lending and borrowing 
between countries as well as the relation between the different type of intra-transactions and 
the capital shares of the NCBs.  
While the dataset is the cornerstone of the analysis of this paper, it also provides a detailed 
breakdown of the balance sheets of all NCBs within the Eurosystem, which offers scope for 
use in a wide range of empirical investigations. We are happy to make the dataset available 
for other researchers on request. It is also intended to lay the groundwork for our own 




1. A New Dataset of NCB Balance Sheets: 2006 - 2016 
Since the onset of the financial crisis in 2007, despite their somewhat different focus, there has 
been a rapid ballooning of central banks’ balance sheets: at their respective peaks, the Bank of 
England’s balance sheet had grown by 398 per cent (Nov 2012), the Eurosystem’s (as defined 
by the ECB) had grown by 196 per cent (Dec 2017); and the Fed’s had grown by 421 per cent 
(Jan 2015). In the existing literature on the central bank’s balance sheet, such as in Borio and 
Disyatat (2009), Lenza et al, (2010) and Pattipeilohy (2016), more attention has been paid to 
the published Eurosystem balance sheet in general than to the individual balance sheets of the 
NCBs. A simple explanation for this may be the fact that no detailed information is provided 
about the composition by country of the Eurosystem assets and liabilities besides the scattered 
dispersed information published by the individual NCBs in their annual financial accounts. 
Indeed, prior to 2016, the ECB used to publish only the consolidated Eurosystem balance sheet 
and not a disaggregation for each NCB. This paper goes back to the original NCBs’ balance 
sheets, because only by looking at a breakdown of how the individual NCBs and the ECB 
contribute to the consolidated Eurosystem balance sheet can one reveal important aspects of 
the Eurosystem balance sheet developments that otherwise remain concealed.  
In order to reach this aim, this paper presents a new dataset spanning the past 11 years and 
including a comprehensive record of the balance sheets of the individual NCBs and the ECB 
as published in their respective end-of-year financial accounts provided in their annual 
reports. We refer to the summation of the total assets of all NCBs and the ECB as  ‘Eurosystem 
Total Assets’ in short ‘ESTA4’. The complete dataset is presented in the Appendix to this paper 
and includes information on the main components of the asset and liability sides of the 
balance sheet of each NCB and the ECB for the 2006-2016 period. 5 
In a bid to strengthen the Eurosystem’s accountability and transparency, as from July 2016, 
the Governing Council of the ECB decided to publish monthly breakdowns showing how the 
ECB and the NCB balance sheets contribute to the Eurosystem statistical balance sheet. 
However, this measure differs from ESTA since it includes a consolidation adjustment that 
nets out the intra-Eurosystem transactions. Indeed,  Eurosystem total assets as published by 
the ECB, as noted earlier, are (unsurprisingly) significantly lower than the total we derive by 
summing the assets of all the NCBs and the ECB. 
Table 1 shows total assets for each individual NCB and the ECB between 2006 and 2016. The 
year 2006 is chosen as a pre-crisis benchmark for these financial positions. Between 2006 and 
2012, the ESTA almost tripled. The table shows that the Banque de France, Deutsche 
Bundesbank, Banca d’Italia, Banco de Espana and De Nederlandsche Bank jointly contributed 
                                                          
4 The term ‘ESTA’ refers to Eurosystem Total Assets defined as the summation of the Total Assets of all the NCBs 
and the ECB, without any netting of intra-Eurosystem balances. 
5 The dataset is freely available on request from the authors. 
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towards three-quarters of this expansion in the ESTA. In contrast, the ECB itself contributed 
less than 4 per cent of the expansion of the ESTA. 
 
Table 1: Eurosystem Total Assets (ESTA) (Euro Billions) 
 Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
AT 53.4 61.9 83.8 71.6 79.8 99.3 109.4 97.5 92.8 107.0 122.6  
BE 82.8 112.4 153.2 101.5 74.7 127.7 109.8 77.8 75.5 89.0 131.2  
CY                                        10.7 13.5 11.9 15.2 15.1 14.3 11.7 12.0 13.8  
EE                                                                                        3.1 4.3 4.3 6.0 6.7 6.8  
FI 19.8 22.8 30.0 35.6 46.0 98.1 101.2 49.7 47.7 57.4 79.5  
FR 232.2 360.7 553 506.1 481.6 709.3 731.8 550.0 577.7 710.4 845.4  
DE 373.5 483.7 612.6 588.0 671.3 837.6 1,025.30 801.0 770.8 1012.0 1,393.0  
GR 34.9 42.7 70.9 86.6 138.6 168.4 159.8 109.5 103.2 163.5 142.4  
IE 40.3 53.5 116.1 124.9 204.5 176.2 137.5 108.1 81.3 77.2 82.8  
IT 218.6 244.4 267.4 301.3 333.0 539.0 610.0 554.4 530.6 587.4 773.7  
LU 52.4 59.0 100.6 77.0 79.7 127.2 120.4 118.6 117.1 159.0 200.9  
MT                                       2.7 3.2 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 4.3 4.5 5.5  
NL 67.2 102.1 114.6 131.2 133.4 266.6 254.4 158.5 140.2 210.4 290.3  
PT 32.7 38.7 50.7 62.5 99.7 109.8 119.4 111.6 105.6 116.9 137.7  
SK                                                         25.4 25.5 27.2 24.7 22.1 23.1 23.1 27.9  
SL                       8.4 9.3 10.0 8.6 10.2 12.6 10.8 10.9 10.3 12.7  
LT                               11.3 14.5  
LV                 8.0 11.1 14.8  
ES 137.8 175.2 209.0 218.0 202.6 355.6 549.7 381.0 359.3 444.9 577.0  
ECB 105.8 126 383.9 138.0 163.5 230.9 207.3 174.2 185.3 256.6 349.0  
           
 
ESTA* 1,451.4  1,891.5  2,768.7  2,494.4  2,758.0  3,905.0  4,296.1  3,347.0  3,251.3  4,070.7  5,221.3  
PublishedTotal 
Assets** 
1,150.0  1,507.9  2,075.1  1,903.0  2,002.0  2,733.3  2,962.7  2,273.3  2,208.2  2,780.5  3,662.9  
*Eurosystem Total Assets (ESTA) are calculated as the summation of the total assets of each national central bank and the 
ECB as published in the financial statements of the respective Annual Reports (including claims and liabilities between 
Eurosystem central banks). 
**Total Assets as published by the ECB in the Annual Consolidated Balance Sheet of the Eurosystem, which comprises 
assets and liabilities of the Eurosystem NCBs and the ECB after netting out claims and liabilities between Eurosystem 
central banks. 







Figure 1 compares Eurosystem Total Assets (ESTA) as compiled in this dataset with the 
Eurosystem Total Assets as published by the ECB over the 2006-2016 period. Unsurprisingly, 
aggregation of the individual balance sheets of the NCBs results in a significantly larger total 
than that published by the ECB since the latter nets out intra-Eurosystem transactions. It also 
grew more rapidly, by 231 percent (Dec 2007-Dec 2017) compared to growth of 196 per cent 
in the official published figure, cited above.6  Figure 2 shows that the percentage gap between 
the two measures has expanded during almost the whole sample period, and is essentially 
entirely accounted for by intra-Eurosystem claims7.  
The logic of this difference was noted in Whelan (2012): ‘Target2 intra-Eurosystem balances 
disappear from the consolidated Eurosystem balance sheet, so the sum of all NCB balance sheets is 
greater than the Eurosystem balance sheet’; however the data have not until now been collated to 
allow a direct comparison between the two measures. 
Also evident from Figures 1 and 2 is the fact that, while there is no doubt that the Eurosystem 
balance sheet expanded significantly since 2007, the inclusion of intra-Eurosystem balances as 
a balance sheet item in the Eurosystem balance sheet (as compiled here) reveals a growing 
                                                          
6 Since our complete dataset only runs to end-2016, the figure for ESTA at Dec 2017 is an approximation based on 
data published in the disaggregated balance sheet of the ECB rather than calculated as the summation of all the 
NCBs  plus the ECB as in the rest of the paper. However, this should be a close approximation since it captures 
intra-ES transactions which account for most of the discrepancy between the two versions of total assets. 
7 The percentage gap between the two definitions of total assets registered a steady increase except for 2009 and 
2016, when the gap was slightly lower than that noted in the previous year. In all years except 2008, intra-











Figure 1: Eurosystem Total Assets vs ECB Published Figures
Total Assets (ESTA)*
TA published by ECB**
* sum of NCB's (and ECB's) Assets
** consolidated balance sheet as reported by the ECB
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proportional gap between the two definitions of Eurosystem Total Assets. The nature of this 
expansion is investigated later on in the paper. 
 
 
Figure 3 shows the share of each NCB in the Eurosystem balance sheet (defined by ESTA). 
The striking stability of these shares, especially for the larger NCBs is investigated further in 
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Figure 2: ESTA*, TA as per ECB** and intra-Eurosystem balances
ESTA (Euro bns) TA as published by ECB (Euro bns)
intra-ES Claims (Euro bns) ESTA -TA(as per ECB) as % of ESTA (rhs)
secondary axis





The aim of the dataset presented here goes beyond offering an alternative definition of the 
Eurosystem Total Assets; it also provides a new perspective on the behaviour of national 
central banks (NCBs) within the Eurosystem, leading us to posit the existence of a “mega-
ECB”, of which the NCBs simply act as local branches. 
Tornell (2012) provides a motivation for our analysis. Despite that the Eurosystem balance 
sheet grew with a similar magnitude to that of other main central banks such as the Bank of 
England and the Fed8, as Tornell (2012) puts it: ‘this aggregate number, however, masks a huge 
cross-country asymmetry: central bank domestic credit to private banks in the Eurozone periphery has 
increased massively’. Indeed, as illustrated in the Figure 4, the domestic credit of NCBs for 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain has increased eight-fold since 2006 (until 2012). This 
domestic credit creation has been financed by borrowing from other Euro Area NCBs 
facilitated by the Target2 mechanism – the leading European platform for processing large-
value payments (see Section 5 for a detailed description). Figure 4 shows a notable similarity 
between the increase in NCB domestic credit and Target2 liabilities9. Therefore, Tornell (2011) 
suggests: ‘in order to analyse Eurozone dynamics, Target2 balances must be added as a new item in 
the standard textbook central bank’s balance sheet’: 
                                                          
8 Such an expansion is even more accentuated if one follows the ESTA definition presented here. 








AT BE FI FR DE EL IE IT LU NE PT ES ECB
Figure 3: Share of NCB's Total Assets to ESTA*






NCBs of Cyprus, Estonia, Malta, Slovenia, Slovakia, Latvia and Lithuania do not feature in this figure 
since their share of total assets to ESTA is relatively small.
*share to ESTA defined as the sum of NCBs' (and ECB's) Assets
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Table 2: Stylized Balance Sheet of a National Central Bank in the Eurozone 
ASSETS LIABILITIES 
Credit to Domestic Agents Money Balances 
Gold and Reserves 
Target2 Liabilities 
Target2 Claims 
Source: Tornell (2012) 
 







The dataset presented in this paper allows investigation of the contribution of each National 
Central Bank to the Eurosystem and of the relationship between the NCBs and the ECB. 
Indeed, based on this dataset, the next section observes the relationship between the share of 
total assets of each NCB to the ESTA and their shares in the ECB’s paid-up capital. 
Subsequently, this dataset is used to investigate the relationship between the NCBs’ balance 












2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Figure 4: Central Bank Domestic Credit and T2 Liabilities*
GIIPS
Domestic Credit T2 Liabilities
Euro billions
*negative positions on the balance sheets of the NCBs vis-a-vis the ECB as the central counterparty
GIIPS: Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain
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2. Are National Central Banks on auto-pilot? The predictive power of the ECB’s capital 
Similar to any financially independent institution with its own legal personality, the financial 
endowment of the ECB is provided by its shareholders. However, the financial arrangements 
of the ECB are unique. Unlike any other central bank, the ECB’s shareholders are the NCBs of 
all EU member states10, with each NCB owning a share of the ECB’s equity. In other words, 
pursuant to Article 28 of the ESCB Statute, the NCBs are the sole subscribers to and holders 
of the capital of the ECB11. 
At the end of 2016, the total subscribed capital12 of the ECB amounted to €10.8 billion, of which 
€7.6 billion had been paid-up by the Eurosystem NCBs and €0.12 billion by the non-Euro Area 
NCBs. Each NCB owns a notional share of the ECB’s subscribed capital which is given 
formulaically by its “capital key”: an equal weighting of the respective country’s share in the 
total population and GDP of the EU13.  But as a measure of the true shares in the equity of 
ECB, the officially published “capital key” is a fiction, given the gap between  subscribed and 
paid-up capital. (The official capital key represents the notional share of each NCB in a 
counterfactual world where all EU countries had adopted the euro). In the calculations below, 
therefore, the shares of fully paid-up capital are, instead, considered as the true capital shares 
of each NCB in the ECB. A further minor adjustment14 is then carried out so that when we 
exclude the nine non-Euro Area NCBs, the capital shares of the Eurosystem members (based 
on the paid-up capital) are rebased to sum to 100 per cent. We refer to the resultant shares as 
the ‘Adjusted Capital Key (ACK)’.  
As an example, in 2016, while the Deutsche Bundesbank’s official “capital key” was 18.0 per 
cent, its share of paid-up capital was 25.2 per cent. When the non-Euro Area countries are 
excluded, this share is then minimally adjusted upwards to 25.6 per cent (for details, see 
Appendix Table B1). 
Since the ESTA includes the summation of the total assets of all NCBs as well as the total assets 
of the ECB, the latter was apportioned across the nineteen NCBs in order to eliminate the ECB. 
This implies that the level of total assets for each NCB was adjusted to include the 
apportionment of the ECB’s assets. The adjusted total assets for each NCB are therefore larger 
than the level published in their respective Annual Reports. This apportionment was 
necessary so that when the ECB is not included in the analysis (such as when investigating 
                                                          
10 In turn, these NCBs are fully or substantially owned by their respective governments.   
11 The Eurosystem NCBs are required to pay up their subscribed capital in full while the non-Euro Area NCBs pay 
up only a minimal percentage (3.75%) of their subscribed capital as a contribution to the operational costs of the 
ECB. 
12 The subscribed capital of the ECB was originally set at ECU 5 billion. It is automatically increased when new 
Member States accede to the EU, pro rata to their weighting in the ECB’s expanded capital key.  
13 Article 29 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central 
Bank annexed to the Treaty establishing the European Community (OJ C 191, 29.7.1992, p. 68). 




relationships with the capital key presented later on in this section) the nineteen NCBs assume 
a portion of the ECB’s assets (as ECB part-owners) in order to reach the same level of ESTA 
(Appendix Table B1).  
According to the framework set by the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and the 
ECB, very few components of the NCBs’ balance sheets are distributed amongst the central 
banks of the Euro Area members in line with their respective ECB capital key15. Indeed, for 
most of the components there is no formal regulation indicating the proportions in which the 
NCBs contribute towards the Eurosystem total assets. If a relationship exists between the 
composition by country of Eurosystem total assets and the adjusted shares of the NCBs in the 
ECB capital, it implies that the ECB capital, despite its relative small size, has the power to 
determine the size of the NCBs balance sheet. In other words, the ECB’s capital base, despite 
its miniscule size, has very strong predictive power. Notwithstanding its fundamental 
implications, literature on this issue, so far, remains rather scarce. Ingram (2011) hints on this 
subject matter in his contribution to the book ‘The Capital Needs of Central Banks’: ‘it may be 
that (NCBs) balance sheet contents will gradually tend towards harmonization; their components will 
tend to be distributed across the Eurosystem’s consolidated balance sheet more in line with their capital 
key shares’. This is, in fact, the subject matter investigated in this section.  
Figure 5 and Table 3 compare the shares of total assets of each NCB to the total assets of the 
Eurosystem (ESTA) to the adjusted capital key; while Figure 6 plots the actual and implied 
total assets for each NCB separately.   
The key features revealed by Table 3 and Figures 5 and 6 are: 
 For most NCBs, the adjusted capital key is close to the share of total assets (ESTA) 
 This relationship is distinctly stronger for the larger National Central Banks. 
 Even when the level of the share differs from the adjusted capital key (as, most 
strikingly, for Luxembourg), the growth rates of most NCB’s assets still track the 
growth rate of ESTA quite closely. 
                                                          
15 The ECB’s capital key is the mechanism for regulating the contribution of the ECB’s foreign reserve assets, the 
allocation of its profits and losses, the allocation of the Eurosystem’s monetary income and the allocation of the 

































Table 3 shows that if we compare the ratio of actual total assets of each NCBs to total assets of the 
Eurosystem (ESTA) with the adjusted capital key of each NCB (implied shares of total assets), the 
differences are mostly quite small and stable. In the case of NCBs such as France, Germany, 
Netherlands and Austria the discrepancy between the actual share of ESTA and the adjusted 
share of the ECB capital decreased over time up to 2015, though widened slightly again in 2016. 
In the case of the central banks of Portugal, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Italy and Finland, the two 
ratios widened for the first few years of the crisis but got closer again over the more recent years 
as the crisis subsided.  
It is evident from Figures 5 and 6 that the correlation between NCB shares of ESTA and the 
adjusted capital key is distinctly higher for the larger NCBs. This implies that as the true balance 
sheet of the Eurosystem expands, the relatively large NCBs expand in line. In contrast, the smaller 
is the NCB the weaker is the correlation between the ratio of total assets and the respective 
adjusted capital key. For instance, as the central banks of Germany, France and Italy are the 
largest three ECB owners, their level of total assets follow the level implied by the capital key 
very closely. The behaviour of the relatively large NCBs being distinct from that of the relatively 
small NCBs may be explained by the fact that their behaviour reflects the common good of the 
unified whole. On the other hand, as the behaviour of the relatively small NCBs will not lead to 
any material consequence on the “Mega-ECB” they can act as free riders. The more significant 
deviations by the relatively smaller NCBs between their actual total assets and that implied by 
the adjusted capital key may indicate some level of autonomy in their behaviour which is not 
evident in case of the larger NCBs.  
It is clear that a close, albeit not perfect, relationship exists between the share of total assets of the 
NCBs to ESTA and their adjusted share of the ECB capital in case of nearly all the NCBs.16 This 
result is even more striking since the paid-up capital of the ECB constitute an extremely small 
proportion of the ESTA17, a mere 0.1 per cent. This implies that the activities of the NCBs are 
driven by their adjusted share of the ECB capital; shedding doubt on whether NCBs have any 
discretion to determine the size of their own balance sheets.  
Our conclusion from this relationship is that to a quite good approximation the NCBs are 
effectively operating on auto-pilot: expanding their balance sheets in line with the total balance 
sheet of what we therefore refer to as the “Mega-ECB”. 
                                                          
16 This result is strongly supported by preliminary econometric investigations: panel regressions of log (NCB assets) 
on log(ESTA) result in slope estimates trivially different from unity. 
17 The total balance sheet size of the ECB stood at €349.0 billion at the end of 2016, implying a ratio of paid-in capital 
(as of end-2016) to total assets of 2 per cent. In turn, the total assets of the ECB constitute almost 7 per cent of the 






3. An anatomy of intra-Eurosystem transactions  
Having described how the summation of all the NCBs and the ECB balance sheet (the ESTA) 
differs from the Eurosystem balance sheet published by the ECB, this section focuses on the 
impact of intra-Eurosystem transactions on the balance sheet of individual NCBs. Most of the 
literature discusses only one particular sub-component of these intra-Eurosystem balances, 
namely TARGET2. Nevertheless, as considerable balances may arise in the other sub-
components, an investigation of all the main sub-components of these intra-Eurosystem balances 
is carried out in Section 5.  
As discussed earlier, the balance sheet item ‘intra-Eurosystem claims/liabilities’ do not feature in 
the Eurosystem consolidated balance sheet published by the ECB. However, this item appears on 
the NCBs’ balance sheets and is therefore included in the Eurosystem balance sheet compiled in 
this paper as the aggregation of the NCB’s balance sheets. For this reason, the sum of all the NCBs’ 
balance sheets is greater than the Eurosystem balance sheet as published by the ECB. This 
observation, which is also noticed by Whelan (2012), is evident graphically in Figure 1 above 
which compares the ESTA (the sum of the NCBs balance sheets) and the consolidated Total Assets 
– as published by the ECB. 
Since the beginning of the global financial crisis, the size of the NCB’s balance sheets has changed 
significantly. A closer look at the NCB’s balance sheets reveals the role that developments in the 
intra-Eurosystem claims/liabilities had in these balance sheet expansions. In particular, the size 
of the balance sheet of the Bundesbank (as measured by total assets), which represents to around 
one quarter of the total Eurosystem balance sheet, more than tripled between the end of 2006 and 
the end of 2016. A closer look at the balance sheet reveals that around ninety per cent of this 
expansion was attributed to the intra-Eurosystem claims by the Bundesbank. Similarly, the size 
of the balance sheet of the central bank of Netherlands more than quadrupled over the same 
period, with half of this expansion reflecting increases in intra-Eurosystem claims.  
The counterpart of these developments on the Bundesbank’s and the Netherland central bank’s 
balance sheet are the periphery’s intra-Eurosystem liabilities. Indeed, a significant increase in 
intra-Eurosystem liabilities financed almost three quarters of the expansion on the balance sheet 
of Greece, which more than quadrupled during the 2006-2016 period. Similarly, the balance sheets 
of the central bank of Italy tripled while that of Portugal and Spain quadrupled, financed by a 
robust expansion in their intra-Eurosystem liabilities.   
For ten of the Eurosystem’s NCBs, intra-Eurosystem claims/liabilities are the largest item on the 
balance sheets either on the asset side or on the liabilities side. By the end of 2016, this balance 
sheet item totalled more than one and a half trillion euros in aggregate claims or aggregate 
liabilities, equivalent to roughly 14 per cent of Euro Area GDP, more than quadrupling since 2006. 
20 
 
Figure 7 shows that the intra-Eurosystem claims of both Germany and the Netherlands 
comprised around half of their balance sheet over the past recent years, or around twenty per 
cent of their GDP. On the liabilities side, it shows that the intra-Eurosystem liabilities were around 
half the size of the balance sheets of the central banks of Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. 
 
 
Figure 7 also shows that each NCB balance sheet includes an intra-Eurosystem balance on the 
asset side as well as an intra-Eurosystem balance on the liability side. However, typically, an NCB 
has either mostly intra-Eurosystem claims or mostly intra-Eurosystem liabilities. Figure 8 shows 
the net intra-Eurosystem balance (intra-Eurosystem claims less intra-Eurosystem liabilities) 
which is equivalent to the netting-out of the top panel of Figure 7 with the corresponding bottom 
panel.  For most NCBs, the net intra-Eurosystem balance remains significant when compared to 
their respective total assets (see also Appendix Chart C1). The balance sheets of the central banks 
of Germany, Finland and the Netherlands reveal a net intra-Eurosystem balance (claims) 
equivalent to more than one quarter of their balance sheets. On the other hand, net intra-
Eurosystem liabilities are very significant in the case of the central banks of Greece, Italy, Spain 





The offsetting of intra-Eurosystem claims and intra-Eurosystem liabilities may conceal important 
interpretations of developments in intra-Eurosystem claims/liabilities. Moreover, intra-
Eurosystem claims/liabilities are made up of more than one component and therefore, intra-
Eurosystem claims/liabilities may materialize due to different reasons. This implies that an 
investigation of the sub-components of the intra-Eurosystem balances merits consideration and 
is therefore the subject matter of Section 5. 
4. The NCBs’ Balance Sheets and the Eurosystem Balance Sheet as published by the ECB - 
the weaker link  
This section investigates whether a relationship exists between the capital key and the 
distribution of the Eurosystem total assets among the NCBs when the intra-Eurosystem 
transactions are eliminated in the process of consolidating total assets for the Eurosystem18 as 
published by the ECB. 
As identified earlier, a relationship exists between the contribution of each NCB towards Total 
Assets of the Eurosystem (ESTA) and their respective adjusted share in the ECB capital. In this 
section, a similar investigation is carried out to determine whether such a relationship remains 
                                                          
18 All claims and liabilities between Eurosystem central banks, including the ECB, are netted out and are not presented 
at all in any of the Eurosystem’s consolidated financial statements published by the ECB. 
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evident when intra-Eurosystem balances are not taken into account. In other words, a comparison 
is made between the share of consolidated Total Assets as published by the ECB after deducting 
intra-Eurosystem claims for each NCB19 and the respective adjusted capital key. An examination 
of such a relationship is only possible on the basis of the collection of the dataset described in 
Section 2 above, since, prior to 2016, the ECB used to publish only the consolidated Eurosystem 
balance sheet and not a disaggregation for each NCB.  
As discussed in the previous sections, the difference between the Eurosystem Total Assets 
published by the ECB and that calculated by summing up all the balance sheets of the NCBs and 
the ECB is entirely accounted for by intra-Eurosystem claims. This latter item comprised around 
21 per cent of total assets in 2006 but grew up to 31 per cent by 2016 (Figure 2), also explaining 
the widening in the divergence between the two datasets of the Eurosystem balance sheet.  
Based on the same methodology as that applied in Section 2, a comparison is made between the 
actual total assets less intra-Eurosystem claims of each NCB with those predicted by applying the 
adjusted capital share of each NCB to the ESTA less intra-Eurosystem claims20 for the 2006-2016 
period. Therefore, different from the earlier analysis, the intra-Eurosystem balances are here 
consolidated. 
As evident in Appendix Table B5, the shares of actual total assets less intra-ES claims and the 
adjusted capital key for each NCB are close or get closer over time in most of the cases. This 
observation is similar to that made earlier in the case of TA (including intra-ES claims). However, 
it is noteworthy, that in the case of Germany, Greece and Italy, the divergence between their share 
of actual total assets excluding intra-ES claims and their respective capital key widens over time 
(Appendix Table B6). In the case of Germany, the share of total assets (excl. intra-ES claims) fails 
to sustain the level recorded prior to the crisis, which was relatively close to the Germany’s 
adjusted share of ECB capital. In contrast, in 2016, in the case of Italy and Greece, the share of 
their assets (excl. intra-ES claims) exceeded their respective adjusted share in the ECB capital (see 
Figure 9 and 10). A graphical investigation (Appendix Chart C2) into the relationship between 
shares of total assets excluding intra-ES liabilities and the adjusted capital key also indicate that 
there is a weak link between the two. 
                                                          
19 Based on the definitions explained earlier, the summation of Total Assets less intra-Eurosystem claims for each NCB 
is equal to Total Assets as published by the ECB in the consolidated Eurosystem balance sheet.  
20 Based on the methodology applied earlier, the ESTA less intra-Eurosystem claims is calculated as the summation of 
total assets of all NCBs plus an apportionment of the ECB Total Assets less the summation of the intra-Eurosystem 





At this juncture, it is interesting to analyse how the exclusion of intra-ES claims from total assets 
affects the closeness of the share of total assets to the adjusted share of the ECB capital. If one 
were, therefore, to compare the observations presented in Section 2 to those presented here, it is 
evident that, with some exceptions, total assets including intra-ES claims follow the adjusted 
share of the ECB capital markedly more closely than when intra-ES claims are excluded.  Most 
noticeable is the case of Germany. As the central bank of Germany’s total assets accounted for 
28.4 per cent of ESTA in 2016, the bank’s adjusted share of the ECB capital stood at a close 25.6 
per cent. However, when intra-ES claims are excluded, the share of total assets declined to 16.5 
per cent in 2015 and 18.9 per cent in 2016. That is, as we show below, the Bundesbank very 
significantly increased its lending to other NCBs. This implies that the central bank of Germany 
sustained a share of total assets in line with its adjusted capital key but this relationship is 
disguised when intra-ES claims are consolidated. In contrast, a minimal level of intra-ES claims 
on the balance sheet of the central bank of Greece explain the fact that, by 2016, the share of total 
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Figure 9:  Shares of published Total Assets and Shares of ESTA vs Adjusted Capital Key
2006-2016



















Based on the above observations, one can conclude that, the underlying relationship identified 
earlier is disguised when intra-ES claims are consolidated (that is, in line with the ECB 
definition of the Eurosystem). 
5. The relation between sub-components of intra-Eurosystem claims/liabilities and the 
capital shares of the NCBs 
Thus far we have focussed on total intra-Eurosystem balances. In this section, we examine the 
composition of these balances in more detail. Intra-ES balances comprise: 
i) the participating interest of the NCB in the ECB  
ii) the NCB’s euro-denominated claims/liabilities arising from the transfer of 
foreign reserves to the ECB  
iii) claims/liabilities related to the allocation of euro banknotes within the 
Eurosystem (net)21 and  
iv) claims/liabilities arising from balances of TARGET2 accounts. 
While the first two sub-components – participating interest in the ECB22 and transfer of foreign 
reserves23 - are recorded as an asset on the NCBs’ balance sheet, the other two sub-components 
– adjustment of banknotes in circulation and Target2 balances – appear on either the asset side 
or the liabilities side of the NCBs’ balance sheet (see Appendix A). This has two important 
implications:  
First, as highlighted earlier, the fact that a sub-component/s of intra-Eurosystem balances may 
appear on either the asset side or the liabilities side implies that looking merely at the net intra-
Eurosystem claims or net intra-Eurosystems liabilities disguises distinctly different patterns in 
the components listed above. In particular, for Belgium, Italy, Portugal and Spain significant 
intra-Eurosystem claims partly offset intra-Eurosystem liabilities. In contrast, France’s, 
Germany’s and Luxembourg’s intra-Eurosystem claims were diluted by intra-Eurosystem 
liabilities; while in the case of Austria intra-Eurosystem claims were almost equal to intra-
Eurosystem liabilities, resulting in a minimal net intra-Eurosystem position (see Figure 7 and 
                                                          
21 The adjustment of banknotes in circulation represents the difference between the banknotes physically issued by 
a given NCB and the share of all circulating euro banknotes that has been assigned to that NCB according to a specific 
key. 
22 This balance sheet item mainly comprise the share of each NCB in the capital of the ECB – the capital key (see 
Appendix Table B3.1).  
23 As evident in Appendix Table B3.2, this item, which is recorded on the asset side of the NCBs balance sheet, reflects 
transfers of foreign exchange reserves to the ECB. An equivalent amount is recorded as an intra-Eurosystem liability 
on the ECB balance sheet.  
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Figure 8). In sum, gross and net intra-Eurosystem balances are strongly, but imperfectly, 
correlated.  
Second, the reasons why intra-Eurosystem claims and intra-Eurosystem liabilities arise and 
fluctuate can vary extensively amongst NCBs. Most of the existing literature consider only 
Target2 as the main reason for raising intra-Eurosystem claims/liabilities while, in contrast, the 
literature considering the other sub-components is scarce. This makes it even more relevant to 
investigate the sub-components to understand the core reasons for developments in the intra-
Eurosystem balances. 
For the 2006-2016 period, data reported in this paper on intra-Eurosystem claims/liabilities and 
their sub-components (apart from T2) were collected from the balance sheets of the NCBs 
published annually in their financial statements. In most of the NCBs balance sheets, data on 
T2 balances are recorded under ‘other claims/liabilities on the Eurosystem’ and do not feature 
as a separate item. Therefore, data on T2 balances were collected from the dataset published by 
the ECB since 2008 and by the ‘Euro Crisis Monitor’ of the Institute for Empirical Economic 







Figure 11 shows that the adjustment of banknotes in circulation and Target2 positions comprise 
the two main sub-components of total intra-Eurosystem balances.24 The share of net 
claims/liabilities related to the adjustment of banknotes in circulation decreased as net T2 
claims/liabilities became more prominent.  
As noted earlier, intra-Eurosystem claims/liabilities for different NCBs may be very similar, but 
for fundamentally different reasons. Jobst et al. (2012) provide examples relevant to this point 
– while Greece built-up intra-Eurosystem liabilities by raising negative Target2 balances, 
Germany recorded intra-Eurosystem liabilities prior to 2007 in the form of a liability arising 
from the adjustment of banknotes in circulation (we discuss this component further below). 
Moreover, Jobst et al. (2012) draws on the case of Austria to highlight that Target2 positions 
may reflect other intra-flows such as the adjustments of euro banknotes in circulation. This 
emphasises the point that looking at the other sub-components is a pre-requisite not only to 
understand the source of intra-Eurosystem claims/liabilities but also for a correct interpretation 
of Target2 balances. 
Looking at the data for these sub-components by country (see Figure 13 and Figure 14), one can 
draw on various other examples similar to the ones highlighted by Jobst et. al (2012) mentioned 
earlier. For instance, while France recorded net intra-ES claims on the basis of claims related to 
the allocation of euro banknotes, Luxembourg built-up intra-ES claims through positive T2 
balances. Meanwhile, intra-ES claims recorded on the balance sheet of the central bank of 
Netherlands reflects both claims related to the adjustment of banknotes in circulation as well as 
net T2 claims. Similarly, on the liabilities side, net Eurosystem balances for France consist 
entirely of T2 liabilities while for Luxembourg net Eurosystem balances reflected liabilities 
related to the allocation of euro banknotes.  
Accounting for more than one-third of Eurosystem total assets, the importance of intra-
Eurosystem claims as an item on the NCBs balance sheet is certain. Moreover, the role of intra-
Eurosystem balances as a means to disguise the relationship between total assets and the capital 
key cannot be ignored. It is therefore interesting to investigate the relationship between the 
main sub-components of intra-Eurosystem claims/liabilities25 and the adjusted capital key.  
One of the main sub-components of intra-Eurosystem balances constitute the net claims and 
liabilities of the Euro Area NCBs vis-à-vis the ECB as the central counterpart. These arise 
                                                          
24 The two panels of Figure 11 are virtually identical but differ slightly due to small statistical discrepancies 
between the totals of intra-ES claims and liabilities. 
25The participating interest in the ECB and the NCB’s euro-denominated claims arising from the transfer of foreign 
reserves to the ECB together accounted for a less than 1 per cent of total assets in 2016 and around 3 per cent of intra-
ES claims and are therefore not considered in this analysis.  
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through cross-border payments settled in central bank money of the respective national 
banking sectors or the NCBs themselves and are executed through the common euro area 
payment platform known as Target2. Through Target2, NCBs can borrow from or lend to other 
NCBs26 .  
Prior to the start of the financial crisis in 2007, T2 balances were small in magnitude and mostly 
reflected differences in payment habits across countries. Since the onset of the crisis in mid-
2007, however, T2 balances have become more pronounced. Indeed, balances of most countries 
increased significantly and peaked in 2012, declining slowly thereafter before peaking again in 
2016. For instance, the T2 balance of the central bank of Germany reached a peak of €754 billion 
at the end of 2016, roughly equivalent to 25 per cent of Germany’s annual GDP. The central 
bank of Italy, which had net T2 claims of €23 billion in 2008, had a net T2 liabilities of €357 
billion by the end of 2016. Similarly, the central bank of Spain’s T2 liabilities reached €328 billion 
at the end of 2016 from a surplus of €25 billion in 2008 (Figure 12). The renewed widening of T2 
imbalances since 2015 is linked to the implementation of the ECB Asset Purchase Programme27  
(APP) (Castillo and Varela (2017)). 
                                                          
26A Target claim on a NCBs balance sheet means that overall there has been a net inflow of euro payments to that 
country’s banking system; in case of a Target liability, a net outflow has taken place. 
27 According to the ECB, the Bundesbank and the Bank of International Settlements (BIS), the implementation of the 
APP cause a direct impact on T2 balances as it could involve cross-border payment by the purchasing NCB as 
securities could be bought from a range of counterparties. On the other hand, the central bank of the Netherlands 
attach the renewed rise in the T2 balances to the sustained fragmentation and risk perceptions within the Euro Area. 






A controversial debate in the literature evolved on the likely causes and consequences of this 
sharp increase in Target2 balances. While some maintain that the high balances pose a problem 
(Sinn and Wollmershauser, 2012), others interpret them as merely a by-product of the banking 
and sovereign debt crisis (Buiter et al. 2011, Auer 2012 and Jobst 2009). Most literature points 
towards the premise that T2 balances reflect the high strains in the financial markets (De 
Grauwe and Ji, 2012) while others consider Target2 balances as a consequence of current 
account imbalances (Sinn 2011 and Sinn and Wollmershaeuser 2012). 
The fact that T2 balances became highly negative for NCBs in countries experiencing financial 
strain like Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain and highly positive in countries where payments 
were inflowing like Germany28, contributed towards an escalated debate. In this context, a 
common viewpoint on T2 balances has been that they represent a ‘bailout’ for the periphery 
countries and interpret the accumulation of balances by the German central bank as ‘lending 
funds to strapped governments’ (Tornell and Westermann 2011). In contrast, others oppose this 
view and interpret T2 balances as a side effect of monetary policy decisions rather than as a 
bailout requested by national governments (Whelan, 2013). This latter view is supported by the 
                                                          
28 For an explanation of the main reason of the dramatic increase in the T2 liabilities of most peripheral European 
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Figure 12: T2 Claims/Liabilities % of individual NCB's Total Assets




ECB (2015) who declared that T2 balances ‘do not provide a complete picture of the net financial flows 
between countries’.  
Being one of the main forms of lending29 during the Eurozone crisis, another branch of literature 
on this subject examined the relationship between T2 liabilities and developments in the 
sovereign bond market. De Grauwe and Ji (2012) observed both graphically and through a 
regression strategy, that, for the period after 2008, high government bond yields were 
associated with large T2 liabilities, and low government bond yields with large T2 claims. 
Similarly, Steinkamp and Westermann (2012) observe a close relationship between lending (80 
per cent of which is made up of T2 balances) and the interest rate spread (as well as bond prices) 
in the recent sovereign debt crisis in Europe. This link between the spreads30 and T2 balances is 
theoretically explained by the fact that sovereign bondholders sell bonds of distressed countries 
pushing up their government bond yields and buy bonds of countries they trust lowering the 
bond yields. In turn, distressed countries are associated with relatively high T2 imbalances 
while safer countries are characterised by T2 claims.  
The same methodology presented in the previous analysis is applied to identify whether a 
relationship exists between the share of T2 claims/liabilities (for each NCB) to total T2 
claims/liabilities and the respective Adjusted Capital Key31. As displayed in Figure 13, at the 
end of 2016, a large positive German claim accounted for over 70 per cent of total T2 claims 
while its share in ECB capital stood at a much lower 26 per cent. Similarly, the aggregate T2 
balance for Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain accounts for around 80 per cent of the total net T2 
liabilities of EA NCBs. However, these countries together own only a quarter of the ECB capital. 
This is suggestive of the conclusion that no relationship exists between the share of net T2 
claims/liabilities to total T2 claims/liabilities and the share of ECB capital for each NCB. 
 
                                                          
29 T2 is considered lending by the markets because it is collateralized to a large extent by the country government 
bonds (see Steinkamp and Westermann (2012), Garber (1999), Sinn and Wollmershauser (2012)). 
30 Spreads are usually defined as the differences between 10-year government bond rates of a country and that of 
German government bond. 
31 In cases when an NCB records T2 claims (rather than T2 liabilities), the share is calculated as a ratio of the 
summation on T2 claims (taking into account only NCBs with T2 claims). Similarly, when an NCB records T2 





The other main sub-component of intra-Eurosystem claims/liabilities relate to the allocation of 
euro banknotes in circulation and account for around one-third of total intra-ES 
claims/liabilities of the Eurosystem. Euro banknotes are issued by all Euro Area NCBs. 
However, for accounting purposes, the ECB reports 8 per cent of total banknotes in circulation 
in its own balance sheet while the remaining 92 per cent is presented in the balance sheets of 
the NCBs in proportion to their paid-up shares in the capital of the ECB (the banknote allocation 
key). Thus, the difference between the net amounts of banknotes put into circulation by the 
individual NCBs and the amounts of banknotes allocated to them (on the basis of the banknote 
allocation key) gives rise to intra-Eurosystem claims or liabilities. If the share of net value of 
banknotes put into circulation by an NCB is higher than its share based on the banknote 
allocation key, that NCB reports a corresponding net liability arising from the allocation of euro 
banknotes in circulation within the Eurosystem. If an NCB issues fewer banknotes than that, it 
accumulates a net claim32.   
Data pertaining to net claims/liabilities related to the allocation of euro banknotes within the 
Eurosystem for each NCB indicate that during the 2006-2016 period, the Bundesbank recorded 
an increasing share of net liabilities related to the allocation of euro banknotes33 (see Appendix 
                                                          
32These procedures are set out in ‘Decision of the European Central Bank on the issue of euro banknotes’ 
(ECB/2010/29); Official Journal of the European Union L35, 9 February 2011, page 26. 
33Total liabilities related to the allocation of euro banknotes is calculated as the summation of the net liabilities related 
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Table B4.1). In fact, for Germany, this share increased from 50 per cent in 2006 to around 70 per 
cent by 2016. Meanwhile, France, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain recorded increasing net 
claims related to the allocation of euro banknotes.  
Being the world’s number one country in the use of cash (Bundesbank, 2016), it is not surprising 
that the central bank of Germany not only reported an intra-ES liability related to the allocation 
of euro banknotes, but the share of this balance sheet item to the total for all NCBs (70 per cent 
in 2016) significantly exceeded Germany’s share of the ECB capital (26 per cent). This implies 
that the banknotes in circulation in Germany were significantly higher than the amount 
allocated on the basis of the banknote allocation key. Jobst et al. (2012) distinguish two main 
reasons why this may take place – international travel and foreign exchange trading services. 
Though this merits further investigation, these channels seem to be plausible reasons for the 
relatively high level of banknotes in circulation, which led to a share of net liabilities related to 
the allocation of euro banknotes significantly exceeding the share of the ECB capital in 
Germany. Note issues in Greece and Ireland are also higher than their allocation, in the latter 
case also leading to a net liability that exceeds the Irish share of the ECB capital (see Appendix 
Table B4.3).  
Also noteworthy is the fact that although the central bank of Luxembourg own a mere 0.3 per 
cent of the ECB capital, it holds 21 per cent (2016) of total net liabilities related to the allocation 
of euro banknotes therefore putting a substantially high level of banknotes in circulation. It is, 
however, quite difficult to attribute this to one particular reason.  
The Netherlands, Austria and Portugal put a lower amount of euro banknotes in circulation 
than their allocation resulting in net claims on their central bank’s balance sheets. Together, 
they account for one quarter of the total net claims related to euro banknotes despite that they 
hold only less than ten per cent of the ECB capital. The central bank of France issued a 
significantly lower amount of euro banknotes than allocated particularly in the early years of 
the financial crisis.  
To conclude, the share of net claims/liabilities related to the allocation of euro banknotes seem 
to be uncorrelated with the NCBs adjusted capital share. The existent literature identified a 
number of channels that may be responsible for the migration of banknotes issued by each NCB. 
The NCBs do not have control of this movement of currency since the issuance of euro 
banknotes is entirely demand-driven. This may lead to a NCB to use more than its allocation 
such as Germany, Greece and Ireland or underuse their allocation such as Spain and Portugal. 
Irrespective of whether the NCBs under or overutilise their allocation of euro banknotes 
(leading to either net claims or net liabilities related to euro banknotes in circulation), it seems 
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that there is no relation between the magnitude at which they diverge from their allocation and 
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*Malta is not included since net claims related to the allocation of euro banknotes were minimal.
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6.  Concluding Remarks 
This paper presented a new dataset on national central bank balance sheets over the 2006-2016 
period. Based on this dataset, an alternative balance sheet of the Eurosystem is assembled 
through a simple summation of the nineteen NCBs’ and the ECB’s balance sheets. This balance 
sheet for the Eurosystem is significantly larger than that published by the ECB. It is a balance 
sheet for the “Mega-ECB” – an institution that is larger than the Eurosystem - that considers 
intra-Eurosystem claims/liabilities of each NCB as contributing to the asset/liabilities side of its 
balance sheet. Based on this dataset, the goal of this paper was to investigate the relationship 
between the ECB and the NCBs in order to determine any possible evidence of distinctive 
power by the ECB over the NCBs. Being the main discrepancy between the balance sheet 
presented here and that published by the ECB, the intra-Eurosystem transactions were the 
subject matter dealt with in the second part of this paper.  
It was shown, firstly, that a correlation exists between the share of total assets of each NCB to 
ESTA (total assets for the “Mega-ECB”) and their respective adjusted capital key. Moreover, it 
was evident that in case of the relatively larger NCBs, the correlation between their share of 
total assets and their adjusted capital key is even stronger. On the other hand, for smaller NCBs, 
some degree of autonomy was detected as the correlation between the share of total assets and 
their capital key is weaker. It was also shown that, over the period under investigation, in cases 
where total assets of a NCB were below the level determined by the capital key, total assets 
increased over time.  
Finally, this paper investigates the relationship between the share of total assets of each NCB 
and their respective adjusted capital key when intra-Eurosystem transactions are consolidated 
– in line with the Eurosystem balance sheet published by the ECB. It is shown that for some of 
the larger NCBs, when intra-ES claims are excluded from their balance sheet (in line with the 
ECB methodology) the correlation between their share of total assets and their adjusted capital 
key is weaker than that observed when intra-ES transactions are not consolidated (as in the 
dataset in this paper). We show that this weaker correlation reflects the fact that no correlation 
is observed between the share of each sub-component of intra-Eurosystem transactions for each 
NCB and the respective ACK.  
Comparing the Eurosystem balance sheet published by the ECB with that presented here 
indicates that systematic behaviour of NCBs is being disguised by the way the balance sheet of 
the Eurosystem is being published by the ECB. In other words, the systematic behaviour of 
NCBs is distinctly harder to detect when intra-Eurosystem transactions are netted off in the 
Eurosystem balance sheet. This is enough evidence for one to conclude that the way data is 
published by the ECB obscure the fact that NCBs (or at least some of them) act on an auto-pilot 
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system. The puzzle is not entirely solved yet – these observations pose further questions. If we 
conclude that the “Mega-ECB” exists, then the obvious follow-on question  is:  who runs it? Is 
it driven by the needs of distressed central banks with the rest of the NCBs lending the money 
as the ECB prescribes? This paper suggests an affirmative answer; but this merits further 
investigation. 
This paper is part of a series of papers. Indeed, the findings of this paper suggest a number of 
avenues for further research that will be dealt with in the papers to follow. Firstly, since the 
empirical evidence presented in this first paper is only of a graphical nature, the next paper will 
offer a systematic regression-type analysis based on an econometric testing procedure based on 
the dataset established here. Moreover, further research aims to focus on a systematic 
comparison between the ECB published data for each NCB and that published by the Federal 
Reserve System for each District. Another important consideration in this respect is a similar 
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Figure A1. Stylized National Central Bank Balance Sheet 
Assets  Liabilities 
FAj Foreign Assets (A.1 + A.2 + A.3) Foreign liabilities (L.6 + L. 7 + L.8) FLj 
 A.1 Gold and gold receivables L.6 Liabilities to EA residents denominated in foreign currency  
 A.2 Claims on non-euro residents denominated in foreign 
currency 
L.7 Liabilities to non-EA residents denominated in foreign 
currency 
 
 A.3 Claims on euro-area residents denominated in foreign 
currency 
L.8 Counterpart of special drawing rights allocated by the IMF  
DAj Domestic Assets (A.4 + A.6 + A.7.2 + A.8) Liabilities denominated in euros (L.3. + L.4 + L.5) DLj 
 A.4 Claims on non-euro residents denominated in euro L.3 Other liabilities to EA credit institutions denominated in 
euro 
 
 A.6 Other claims on euro-area credit institutions 
denominated in euro 
L.4 Liabilities to other EA residents denominated in euro  
 A.7.2 Other securities L.5 Liabilities to non-euro area residents denominated in euro  
 A.8 General Government debt denominated in euro Banknotes in circulation (L.1)  BNj 
MPj Lending to euro area credit institutions related 
to monetary policy operations denominated in 
euro (A.5) 
Liabilities to EA credit institutions related to 
monetary policy operations denominated in euro 
(L.2) 
MPj 
SMPPj Securities held for monetary policy purposes 
(A.7.1) 
Capital and Reserves (L.14) CRj 
 Intra-Eurosystem Claims (A.9) Intra-Eurosystem Liabilities (L.9)  
Pj A.9.1 Participating interest in the ECB Target2 gross debit positions (L.9.2) Cj 
CTRj A.9.2 Claims re transfer of reserves to ECB Liabilities re allocation of euro banknotes (L.9.3) LBNj 
CBNj A.9.3 Claims re allocation of euro banknotes Other liabilities (L.9.4 + L.10 +  L.11 + L.12 + L.13 + L.15) OLj 
Dj A.9.4 Target2 gross credit position L.9.4 Liabilities related to other operational requirements 
within the Eurosytem 
 
OAj Other assets (A.10 + A.11) L.10 Items in course of settlement  
 A.10 Items in course of settlement L.11 Other liabilities  
 A.11 Other assets L.12 Provisions  
  L.13 Revaluation Accounts  
  L.15 Profit for the year  
Source: own compilation 
Note: The composition of the balance sheet may slightly vary between balance sheets published by the National Central Banks in their annual reports or 





Figure A2. Deutsche Bundesbank Balance Sheet 31.12.2016 
Assets (€ bn) Liabilities (€ mn) 
177.6 Foreign Assets (A.1 + A.2 + A.3) Foreign liabilities (L.6 + L. 7 + L.8) 16.6 
119.3 A.1 Gold and gold receivables L.6 Liabilities to EA residents denominated in foreign 
currency 
0 
56.5 A.2 Claims on non-euro residents denominated in foreign 
currency 
L.7 Liabilities to non-EA residents denominated in foreign 
currency 
1.2 
1.8 A.3 Claims on euro-area residents denominated in foreign 
currency 
L.8 Counterpart of special drawing rights allocated by the IMF 15.4 
3.5 Domestic Assets (A.4 + A.6 + A.7.2 + A.8) Liabilities denominated in euros (L.3. + L.4 + L.5) 223.3 
0.4 A.4 Claims on non-euro residents denominated in euro L.3 Other liabilities to EA credit institutions denominated in 
euro 
0.5 
3.0 A.6 Other claims on euro-area credit institutions 
denominated in euro 
L.4 Liabilities to other EA residents denominated in euro 105.8 
0 A.7.2 Other securities L.5 Liabilities to non-euro area residents denominated in euro 117.0 
7.9 A.8 General Government debt denominated in euro Banknotes in circulation (L.1)  264.9 
65.5 Lending to euro area credit institutions related 
to monetary policy operations denominated in 
euro (A.5) 
Liabilities to EA credit institutions related to 
monetary policy operations denominated in euro 
(L.2) 
411.4 
357.7 Securities held for monetary policy purposes 
(A.7.1) 
Capital and Reserves (L.14) 5.6 
766.9 Intra-Eurosystem Claims (A.9) Intra-Eurosystem Liabilities (L.9) 327.3 
1.9 A.9.1 Participating interest in the ECB Target2 gross debit positions (L.9.3) 0 
10.4 A.9.2 Claims re transfer of reserves to ECB Liabilities re allocation of euro banknotes (L.9.2) 327.3 
0 A.9.3 Claims re allocation of euro banknotes Other liabilities (L.9.4 + L.10 +  L.11 + L.12 + L.13 + L.15) 144.0 
754.5 A.9.4 Other net claims34 L.9.4 Liabilities related to other operational requirements 
within the Eurosytem 
0 
17.5 Other assets (A.10 + A.11) L.10 Items in course of settlement 0 
0 A.10 Items in course of settlement L.11 Other liabilities 2.1 
17.5 A.11 Other assets L.12 Provisions 21.9 
  L.13 Revaluation Accounts 119.7 
  L.15 Profit for the year 0.4 
1,393.0 TOTAL ASSETS TOTAL LIABILITIES 1,393.0 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank Annual Report 2016 
 
 
                                                          
















AT  2.0  2.7 2.8           122,556          132,288 
BE  2.5  3.5    3.5           131,180          143,464 
CY  0.2  0.2    0.2             13,845            14,595 
EE  0.2  0.3    0.3               6,761              7,717 
FI  1.3  1.8    1.8             79,504            85,733 
FR  14.2  19.8   20.1           845,362          915,659 
DE  18.0  25.2   25.6        1,393,014       1,482,240 
GR  2.0  2.8    2.9           142,384          152,464 
IE  1.2  1.6    1.6             82,786            88,540 
IT  12.3  17.2    17.5             773,673           834,707 
LU  0.2  0.3    0.3             200,851           201,857 
MT  0.1  0.1    0.1                 5,536               5,858 
NL  4.0  5.6    5.7             290,326           310,174 
PT  1.7  2.4    2.5             137,717           146,361 
SK  0.8  1.1    1.1               27,870             31,700 
SL  0.3  0.5    0.5               12,666             14,379 
LT  0.4  0.6    0.6               14,464             16,512 
LV  0.3  0.4    0.4               14,772             16,171 
ES  8.8  12.4    12.6             577,000           620,831 
ECB  ‐  ‐    ‐             348,984  ‐ 
Non‐Euro Area  29.6  1.6  ‐  ‐  ‐ 







    2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015  2016 
AT  Actual TA  56.5  65.6  94.9  75.5  84.3   105.8  115.1  102.3  98.0  114.1  132.3 
  Implied TA 42.2  54.9  80.1  69.4  76.7   108.4  119.2  93.2  91.2     113.5  145.6 
  Ratio of Actual to Implied TA   1.3 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1  1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.0 0.9 
BE  Actual TA 86.5  116.8  166.8  106.3  80.4   135.7  116.9  83.9  82.1   98.0  143.5 
  Implied TA  51.8  67.2  98.2            86.7  95.9   135.4  148.9  116.3  115.1  143.3  183.8 
  Ratio of Actual to Implied TA  1.7 1.7 1.7 1.2 0.8  1.0 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 
CY  Actual TA      11.4  13.7  12.2  15.6  15.5  14.6  12.1  12.6  14.6 
  Implied TA      5.0  4.9  5.4  7.6  8.4  6.4  7.0  8.7  11.2 
  Ratio of Actual to Implied TA  2.3 2.8 2.3  2.0 1.8 2.3 1.7 1.4 1.3 
EE  Actual TA            3.7  4.8  4.7  6.5  7.4  7.7 
  Implied TA 10.0  11.0  8.6  9.0  11.1  14.3 
  Ratio of Actual to Implied TA            0.4  0.4  0.6  0.7  0.7  0.5 
FI  Actual TA          21.7  25.1  36.9  38.1  48.9  102.3  104.9  52.9  51.0  62.0  85.7 
  Implied TA  26.2  33.9  49.4  44.8  49.6  70.0  77.0  59.9  58.4  72.7  93.2 
  Ratio of Actual to Implied TA  0.8  0.7  0.7  0.9  1.0  1.5  1.4  0.9  0.9  0.9  0.9 
FR  Actual TA 254.2  386.8  632.3  534.2  514.9  756.2  773.9  585.4  615.3  762.1  915.7 
  Implied TA  301.9  391.5  571.5  508.3  562.0  793.7  873.2  680.1  658.8  820.0  1,051.7 
  Ratio of Actual to Implied TA  0.8  1.0  1.1  1.1  0.9  1.0  0.9  0.9  0.9  0.9  0.9 
DE  Actual TA  404.8  520.9  725.6  625.5  715.6  900.1  1,081.4  848.0  818.5  1,077.6  1,482.2 
  Implied TA  429.1  558.4  815.2  676.8  748.4  1,056.9  1,162.7  902.7  836.2  1,040.8  1,334.9 
  Ratio of Actual to Implied TA  0.9  0.9  0.9  0.9  1.0  0.9  0.9  0.9  1.0  1.0  1.1 
GR  Actual TA 37.7  46.0  80.9  90.5  143.2  174.9  165.6  114.4  108.5  170.9  152.5 
  Implied TA  38.5  49.4  72.2  70.2  77.6  109.7  120.6  93.7  94.5  117.6  150.8 
  Ratio of Actual to Implied TA  1.0  0.9  1.1  1.3  1.8  1.6  1.4  1.2  1.1  1.5  1.0 
IE  Actual TA  41.6  55.1  121.0  127.1  207.1  179.9  140.8  110.9  84.4  81.5  88.5 
  Implied TA  18.7  24.2  35.3  39.7  43.9  62.0  68.2  53.5  53.9  67.1  86.1 
  Ratio of Actual to Implied TA  2.2  2.3  3.4  3.2  4.7  2.9  2.1  2.1  1.6  1.2  1.0 
IT  Actual TA       237.9          267.1          336.4          326.0          362.2           580.2          647.0          585.6          563.2          632.3  834.7 
  Implied TA      265.0          341.0          497.7          446.6          493.8           697.4          767.3          599.4          572.0          711.9  913.1 
  Ratio of Actual to Implied TA          0.9              0.8              0.7              0.7              0.7               0.8              0.8              1.0              1.0              0.9  0.9 
MT  Actual TA                                                3.1               3.4               3.8               3.8               3.8               3.8               4.5               4.7   5.9 
  Implied TA                                             2.5               2.3               2.5               3.5               3.9               3.1               3.0               3.7   4.8 
  Ratio of Actual to Implied TA                  1.2               1.5               1.5               1.1               1.0               1.2               1.5               1.3   1.2 
NL  Actual TA        73.1          109.2          136.1          139.1          142.8           279.7          266.2          168.5          150.8          225.0  310.2 
  Implied TA        81.1          106.0          154.7          142.5          157.6           222.6          244.9          190.8          186.0          231.5  297.0 
  Ratio of Actual to Implied TA          0.9              1.0              0.9              1.0              0.9               1.3              1.1              0.9              0.8              1.0  1.0 
                                    
PT  Actual TA  35.4  41.8  60.1   66.0   103.9   115.5  124.6     116.0  110.2    123.3  146.4 
  Implied TA       35.8            46.6             68.1            62.6            69.2             97.7          107.5            84.9            81.0          100.8  129.3 
  Ratio of Actual to Implied TA          1.0               0.9               0.9               1.1               1.5               1.2               1.2               1.4               1.4               1.2   1.1 
SK  Actual TA           26.8             27.1             29.5             26.8             23.8             25.1             25.9   31.7 
  Implied TA           24.8             27.4             38.7             42.6             33.1             35.9             44.7   57.3 
  Ratio of Actual to Implied TA                    1.1               1.0               0.8               0.6               0.7               0.7               0.6   0.6 
SL  Actual TA                8.9            11.1            10.6              9.3             11.3            13.6            11.6            11.8            11.5  14.4 
  Implied TA                8.7            12.7            11.8            13.0             18.3            20.2            15.7            16.1            20.0  25.6 
  Ratio of Actual to Implied TA                1.0              0.9              0.9              0.7               0.6              0.7              0.7              0.7              0.6  0.6 
LT  Actual TA                              12.8   16.5 
  Implied TA                              23.9   30.6 
  Ratio of Actual to Implied TA                                0.5   0.5 
LV  Actual TA                              8.8             12.1   16.2 
  Implied TA           13.1             16.3   20.9 
  Ratio of Actual to Implied TA              0.7               0.7   0.8 
ES  Actual TA      149.3          188.9          250.6          234.4          222.1           383.0          574.3          401.6          382.7          477.1  620.8 
  Implied TA       157.9          205.4          299.9          296.8          328.2           463.4          509.9          397.1          410.8          511.3  655.8 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015  2016 
AT  Adj. re BN                 12.7                 13.4                 9.1                10.2                13.5                15.5                 18.1                16.2                  9.6                  8.3  8.0 
Capital Key                  2.9                  2.9                 2.9                 2.8                 2.8                 2.8                  2.8                 2.8                  2.8                 2.8  2.8 
BE  Adj. re BN                18.0                 17.1                15.2                11.3               10.0                  7.7                  5.9                 4.8                 4.3                 3.5  2.7 
Capital Key  3.6  3.6  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.5 
CY  Adj. re BN                      0.1                 0.1                 0.2                 0.3                  0.4  ‐0.1  0.0                 0.1  0.3 
Capital Key        0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2 
EE  Adj. re BN                          0.7                0.6               0.5               0.6               0.5  0.4 
Capital Key                 0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3 
FI  Adj. re BN                  3.2                  2.7                 2.8                 2.4                 1.8                 1.7                   1.4                 1.3                 1.3                 1.2  1.1 
Capital Key  1.8  1.8  1.8  1.8  1.8  1.8  1.8  1.8  1.8  1.8  1.8 
FR  Adj. re BN                51.3                 48.2                50.5                45.2                41.3                36.7                 32.2                29.4                27.2                25.9  24.6 
Capital Key  20.8  20.7  20.6  20.4  20.4  20.3  20.3  20.3  20.3  20.1  20.1 
DE  Adj. re BN   ‐48.6  ‐51.5  ‐57.9  ‐63.9  ‐62.3  ‐60.4  ‐65.7  ‐66.4  ‐70.5  ‐69.9  ‐72.5 
Capital Key  29.6  29.5  29.4  27.1  27.1  27.1  27.1  27.0  25.7  25.6  25.6 
GR  Adj. re BN   ‐0.9  ‐1.2  ‐1.2  0.0  ‐3.1  ‐6.5  ‐4.7  ‐3.2  ‐1.4  ‐4.6  ‐3.0 
Capital Key  2.7  2.6  2.6  2.8  2.8  2.8  2.8  2.8  2.9  2.9  2.9 
IE  Adj. re BN   ‐5.4  ‐6.4  ‐6.8  ‐6.0  ‐5.9  ‐5.5  ‐5.2  ‐4.9  ‐4.2  ‐3.8  ‐3.7 
Capital Key  1.3  1.3  1.3  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.7  1.6  1.6 
IT  Adj. re BN   ‐8.2  ‐8.4  ‐6.3  ‐4.5  ‐2.8  ‐2.7  1.6  4.9  7.5  9.5  9.8 
Capital Key  18.3  18.0  18.0  17.9  17.9  17.9  17.9  17.9  17.6  17.5  17.5 
LU  Adj. re BN   ‐23.0  ‐23.2  ‐24.3  ‐25.5  ‐25.8  ‐24.8  ‐24.3  ‐25.3  ‐23.9  ‐21.7  ‐20.7 
Capital Key  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3 
MT  Adj. re BN       0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Capital Key        0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1 
NL  Adj. re BN   6.9  8.1 10.3 12.0 12.4 12.9  13.2 13.1 13.4 13.2 13.1 
Capital Key  5.6  5.6 5.6 5.7 5.7 5.7  5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 
PT  Adj. re BN                 7.9                  8.8              10.5              10.8              10.3               10.3                10.8               10.8               10.7              10.3 10.4 
Capital Key  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.5 
SK  Adj. re BN                         1.7                  0.9                  0.4                   0.1                      0                  0.3                   0.3    0.2 
Capital Key           1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.1  1.1  1.1 
SL  Adj. re BN                  1.7               1.6               1.5               1.3                 1.2                  1.1                 0.7                 0.7                 0.4  0.2 
Capital Key  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5 
LT  Adj. re BN                     1.1  1.0 
Capital Key                    0.6  0.6 
LV  Adj. re BN                   1.0  1.0  1.1 
Capital Key                  0.4  0.4  0.4 
ES  Adj. re BN   ‐13.9  ‐9.3  ‐3.4                4.6                8.3                12.5                 14.7                18.1                23.5           24.6  27.1 





  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015  2016 
AT  T2  ‐26.3  ‐14.5 ‐8.8 ‐6.2 ‐6.0 ‐4.1  ‐3.8 ‐5.6 ‐4.9 ‐3.6 ‐2.9 
Capital Key                 2.9                  2.9                2.9                2.8                2.8                2.8                 2.8                2.8                 2.8                2.8  2.8 
BE  T2   ‐52.1  ‐44.0 ‐24.7 ‐13.4 ‐3.0 ‐6.3  ‐3.8 ‐2.2 ‐2.0 ‐1.0 ‐1.7 
Capital Key  3.6  3.6 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5  3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 
CY  T2                         ‐1.5             ‐2.2               ‐1.4               ‐0.9                 ‐0.7               ‐1.0                  ‐0.4           0.3   0.6 
Capital Key        0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2 
EE  T2                          0.1                0.2               0.3               0.5               0.3  0.1 
Capital Key                 0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3 
FI  T2                  1.6                  3.0                 1.0                 1.4                 4.3                 7.9                    6.4                 3.8                 2.5                 2.5  2.1 
Capital Key  1.8  1.8  1.8  1.8  1.8  1.8  1.8  1.8  1.8  1.8  1.8 
FR  T2   0.0  ‐8.5  ‐27.9  ‐19.6  ‐6.2  ‐9.4  ‐7.4  ‐4.8  ‐4.9  ‐3.6  ‐1.3 
Capital Key  20.8  20.7  20.6  20.4  20.4  20.3  20.3  20.3  20.3  20.1  20.1 
DE  T2                   7.4   48.4                   27.5              57.4               71.2                55.5                   69.3                73.8                75.8                  71.9  71.3 
Capital Key  29.6  29.5 29.4 27.1 27.1 27.1  27.1 27.0 25.7 25.6 25.6 
GR  T2  ‐10.2  ‐7.7 ‐8.4 ‐15.5 ‐19.0 ‐12.4  ‐9.8 ‐7.2 ‐7.8 ‐11.6 ‐6.8 
Capital Key  2.7  2.6 2.6 2.8 2.8 2.8  2.8 2.8 2.9 2.9 2.9 
IE  T2   ‐3.2  ‐0.4 ‐10.5 ‐16.9 ‐31.7 ‐14.3  ‐7.9 ‐7.7 ‐3.6 ‐0.4 ‐0.1 
Capital Key  1.3  1.3 1.3 1.6 1.6 1.6  1.6 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.6 
IT  T2   31.2  24.4 5.6 17.9 0.8 ‐22.7  ‐25.5 ‐32.1 ‐33.3 ‐30.6 ‐33.4 
Capital Key  18.3  18.0 18.0 17.9 17.9 17.9  17.9 17.9 17.6 17.5 17.5 
LU  T2                  7.3                12.5                 10.1               17.0               14.9                 13.1                  11.2                 15.0                 17.3                 18.2  17.7 
Capital Key  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3 
MT  T2       ‐0.2  ‐0.3  ‐0.3  ‐0.1  0  ‐0.1  ‐0.3  ‐0.1  0.1 
Capital Key        0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1 
NL  T2         13.6               ‐15.7              ‐4.5  5.0  8.9  18.3  12.8  6.7  3.2  6.7  8.2 
Capital Key  5.6  5.6  5.6  5.7  5.7  5.7  5.7  5.7  5.7  5.7  5.7 
PT  T2               ‐8.2                ‐4.4               ‐4.5               ‐7.4             ‐13.1               ‐7.2                ‐6.6               ‐8.3               ‐8.7               ‐7.6  ‐6.7 
Capital Key  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.5 
SK  T2         ‐4.6  ‐2.9  ‐1.6                 0.1                 0.4                 0.4                 0.1  ‐0.5 
Capital Key           1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.1  1.1  1.1 
SL  T2                  ‐2.5              ‐0.8               ‐1.1             ‐0.5               ‐0.3                ‐0.4               ‐0.1                   0.4                   0    ‐0.1 
Capital Key     0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5  0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
LT  T2       0 ‐0.3 
Capital Key      0.6 0.6 
LV  T2       ‐0.1 ‐0.2 ‐0.5 
Capital Key      0.4 0.4 0.4 
ES  T2   34.2                 ‐2.3            ‐8.3           ‐13.0         ‐11.1          ‐20.7             ‐33.7           ‐29.9          ‐30.1          ‐31.2 ‐30.7 






    2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015  2016 
AT  Actual TA – intra ES claims              37.9               43.6               71.5               55.3               56.3                68.3               69.1               56.7               65.7               82.1  99.5 
Implied TA – intra ES claims              33.4              43.7              60.5              52.9              55.7                75.9              82.2              63.3              62.0              77.6  102.1 
Ratio of Actual to Implied TA               1.1             1.0             1.2             1.0             1.0              0.9             0.8             0.9             1.1             1.1  1.0 
BE  Actual TA – intra ES claims              60.8              88.8            132.0              83.6              58.0              113.6              98.2              67.0              64.8              81.4  128.9 
Implied TA – intra ES claims              41.0               53.6               74.2               66.1               69.6                94.8             102.7               79.0               78.2               97.9  128.9 
Ratio of Actual to Implied TA              1.5             1.7             1.8             1.3             0.8              1.2             1.0             0.8             0.8             0.8  1.0 
CY  Actual TA – intra ES claims              10.6              13.3              11.7                14.7              14.3              14.4              11.8                9.5  7.3 
Implied TA – intra ES claims                       3.7                 3.7                 3.9                  5.3                 5.8                 4.4                 4.8                 6.0  7.9 
Ratio of Actual to Implied TA             2.8            3.6            3.0              2.8            2.5            3.3            2.5            1.6  0.9 
EE  Actual TA – intra ES claims                                1.1                 1.2                 1.1                 1.3                 2.6  4.7 
Implied TA – intra ES claims                    7.0                7.6                5.8                6.1                7.6  10.0 
Ratio of Actual to Implied TA                             0.2             0.2             0.2             0.2             0.3  0.5 
FI  Actual TA – intra ES claims              14.9               16.3               21.4               22.6               23.8                29.8               28.8               24.9               25.0               35.3  57.5 
Implied TA – intra ES claims              20.7              27.0              37.4              34.2              36.0                49.0              53.1              40.7              39.7              49.6  65.4 
Ratio of Actual to Implied TA              0.7             0.6             0.6             0.7             0.7              0.6             0.5             0.6             0.6             0.7  0.9 
FR  Actual TA – intra ES claims            159.5            295.3            486.0            435.6            415.3              644.1            668.9            482.9            507.5            646.7  798.7 
Implied TA – intra ES claims            239.1             312.1             431.9             387.6             408.0              555.6             602.2             462.0             447.5             560.3  737.6 
Ratio of Actual to Implied TA              0.7            0.9            1.1            1.1            1.0              1.2            1.1            1.0            1.1            1.2  1.1 
DE  Actual TA – intra ES claims            370.6             415.9             510.2             416.6             359.6              391.6             387.1             304.0             324.6             458.5  692.3 
Implied TA – intra ES claims            339.8            445.1            616.0            516.2            543.3              739.8            801.9            613.2            568.0            711.1 936.2 
Ratio of Actual to Implied TA              1.1             0.9             0.8             0.8             0.7              0.5             0.5             0.5             0.6             0.6  0.7 
GR  Actual TA – intra ES claims              34.9               42.6               71.8               86.9             139.8              169.9             161.0             110.5             104.4             166.6  148.0 
Implied TA – intra ES claims              30.5              39.4              54.5              53.6              56.4                76.8              83.2              63.7              64.2              80.3  105.8 
Ratio of Actual to Implied TA              1.1             1.1             1.3             1.6             2.5              2.2             1.9             1.7             1.6             2.1  1.4 
IE  Actual TA – intra ES claims              40.4              53.7            116.7            125.2            205.2              177.2            138.3            108.8              82.1              79.2  86.2 
Implied TA – intra ES claims              14.8               19.3               26.7               30.3               31.9                43.4               47.0               36.3               36.6               45.9  60.4 
Ratio of Actual to Implied TA              2.7            2.8            4.4            4.1            6.4              4.1            2.9            3.0            2.2            1.7  1.4 
IT  Actual TA – intra ES claims            197.2             210.5             252.0             250.1             338.4              550.3             617.4             550.4             518.1             576.8  775.2 
Implied TA – intra ES claims            209.9             271.8             376.1             340.6             358.5              488.2             529.2             407.2             388.5             486.4  640.4 
Ratio of Actual to Implied TA              0.9            0.8            0.7            0.7            0.9              1.1            1.2            1.4            1.3            1.2  1.2 
MT  Actual TA – intra ES claims                   2.7             3.3             3.7              3.6             3.7             3.6             4.4             4.6  4.7 
Implied TA – intra ES claims            1.9          1.7           1.8              2.5           2.7          2.1           2.0           2.6 3.4 
Ratio of Actual to Implied TA       1.5  1.9  2.0  1.5  1.4  1.8  2.1  1.8  1.4 
NL  Actual TA – intra ES claims              49.2              91.4            101.7              97.3              73.1                90.4            107.4              81.3              84.0            118.0  168.2 
Implied TA – intra ES claims              64.2               84.5             116.9             108.7             114.4              155.8             168.9             129.6             126.4             158.2  208.3 
Ratio of Actual to Implied TA              0.8            1.1            0.9            0.9            0.6              0.6            0.6            0.6            0.7            0.7  0.8 
PT  Actual TA – intra ES claims             23.2             26.6             36.0         45.1            82.0      89.5  95.8           84.6    75.0   84.8  105.2 
Implied TA – intra ES claims              28.4               37.2               51.4               47.7               50.2                68.4               74.1               57.6               55.0               68.9  90.7 
Ratio of Actual to Implied TA              0.8            0.7            0.7            0.9            1.6              1.3            1.3            1.5            1.4            1.2  1.2 
 
SK  Actual TA – intra ES claims              22.6              24.1                26.8              24.0              19.7              20.2              22.9  29.5 
Implied TA – intra ES claims                        18.9               19.9                27.1               29.4               22.5               24.4               30.5  40.2 
Ratio of Actual to Implied TA                    1.2             1.2              1.0             0.8             0.9             0.8             0.7  0.7 
SL  Actual TA – intra ES claims                6.0                7.1                7.6                6.3                  8.0              10.3                9.1                6.6                9.1  13.0 
Implied TA – intra ES claims                    6.9                 9.6                 9.0                 9.4                12.8               13.9               10.7               10.9               13.7  18.0 
Ratio of Actual to Implied TA             0.9            0.7            0.8            0.7              0.6            0.7            0.8            0.6            0.7  0.7 
LT  Actual TA – intra ES claims                    7.8  11.9 
Implied TA – intra ES claims    16.3 21.5 
Ratio of Actual to Implied TA                     0.5  0.6 
LV  Actual TA – intra ES claims                  5.1  8.0  11.6 
Implied TA – intra ES claims    8.9 11.1 14.7 
Ratio of Actual to Implied TA                   0.6  0.7  0.8 
ES  Actual TA – intra ES claims           113.6            176.4            213.8            212.8            193.1              336.5            522.6            339.5            295.8            376.0  505.1 
Implied TA – intra ES claims            125.0             163.8             226.6             226.3             238.2              324.4             351.6             269.8             279.0             349.3  459.9 


















 Country    2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015  2016 
AT  Actual Share of TA – intra ES Claims        3.3  2.9  3.4  2.9  2.8  2.5  2.3  2.5  3.0  3.0  2.7 
Adjusted Capital Key  2.9  2.9  2.9  2.8  2.8  2.8  2.8  2.8  2.8  2.8  2.8 
BE  Actual Share of TA – intra ES Claims       5.3  5.9  6.3  4.4  2.9  4.2  3.3  2.9  2.9  2.9  3.5 
Adjusted Capital Key  3.6  3.6  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.5 
CY  Actual Share of TA – intra ES Claims             0.5  0.7  0.6  0.5  0.5  0.6  0.5  0.3  0.2 
Adjusted Capital Key    0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2 
EE  Actual Share of TA – intra ES Claims                       0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1 
Adjusted Capital Key      0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3 
FI  Actual Share of TA – intra ES Claims        1.3  1.1  1.0  1.2  1.2  1.1  1.0  1.1  1.1  1.3  1.6 
Adjusted Capital Key        1.8  1.8  1.8  1.8  1.8  1.8  1.8  1.8  1.8  1.8  1.8 
FR  Actual Share of TA – intra ES Claims        13.9  19.6  23.2  22.9  20.7  23.6  22.6  21.2  23.0  23.3  21.8 
Adjusted Capital Key  20.8  20.7  20.6  20.4  20.4  20.3  20.3  20.3  20.3  20.1  20.1 
DE  Actual Share of TA – intra ES Claims       32.2  27.6  24.4  21.9  18.0  14.3  13.1  13.4  14.7  16.5  18.9 
Adjusted Capital Key  29.6  29.5  29.4  27.1  27.1  27.1  27.1  27.0  25.7  25.6  25.6 
GR  Actual Share of TA – intra ES Claims        3.0  2.8  3.4  4.6  7.0  6.2  5.4  4.9  4.7  6.0  4.0 
Adjusted Capital Key  2.7  2.6  2.6  2.8  2.8  2.8  2.8  2.8  2.9  2.9  2.9 
IE  Actual Share of TA – intra ES Claims        3.5  3.6  5.6  6.6  10.3  6.5  4.7  4.8  3.7  2.8  2.4 
Adjusted Capital Key  1.3  1.3  1.3  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.7  1.6  1.6 
IT  Actual Share of TA – intra ES Claims        17.2  14.0  12.0  13.1  16.9  20.1  20.8  24.2  23.5  20.7  21.2 
  Adjusted Capital Key  18.3  18.0  18.0  17.9  17.9  17.9  17.9  17.9  17.6  17.5  17.5 
MT  Actual Share of TA – intra ES Claims             0.1  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.1 
  Adjusted Capital Key    0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1 
NL  Actual Share of TA – intra ES Claims        4.3  6.1  4.9  5.1  3.7  3.3  3.6  3.6  3.8  4.2  4.6 
  Adjusted Capital Key  5.6  5.6  5.6  5.7  5.7  5.7  5.7  5.7  5.7  5.7  5.7 
PT  Actual Share of TA – intra ES Claims        2.0  1.8  1.7  2.4  4.1  3.3  3.2  3.7  3.4  3.0  2.9 
  Adjusted Capital Key  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.5 
SK  Actual Share of TA – intra ES Claims                 1.2  1.2  1.0  0.8  0.9  0.9  0.8  0.8 
  Adjusted Capital Key        1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.1  1.1  1.1 
SL  Actual Share of TA – intra ES Claims           0.4  0.3  0.4  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.4  0.3  0.3  0.4 
  Adjusted Capital Key    0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5 
LT  Actual Share of TA – intra ES Claims                         0.3  0.3 
  Adjusted Capital Key                    0.6  0.6 
LV  Actual Share of TA – intra ES Claims                        0.2  0.3  0.3 
  Adjusted Capital Key                  0.4  0.4  0.4 
ES  Actual Share of TA – intra ES Claims        9.9  11.7  10.2  11.2  9.6  12.3  17.6  14.9  13.4  13.5  13.8 
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Figure C1: Intra ES claims ‐ Intra ES liabilities (€bn)
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Figure C3: Target 2 balances and claims/liabilities related to the allocation of euro banknotes 
2006‐2016 
